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ABSTRACT
Government-sponsored patent assertion entities have materialized
all over the world. This article looks at the market failure associated with
the patent system. These entities have an opportunity to address these
market inefficiencies. But, these entities can damage the innovation more
by decreasing competition and increasing protectionism. This article looks
at three such entities and argues that the US could use such an entity.

1
Lecturer of Law, Economics & Regulations at Queen Mary University of London, Centre
for Commercial Law Studies. The first draft of this article was written while visiting at the Georgia
Institute of Technology. J.D. from the University of Virginia School of Law and Ph.D. in Economics
from Yale University. I would like to thank Nikolaus Thumm for our conversations.
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INTRODUCTION
Some entities have come under fire because they have started to
profitably enforce patents.2 Some scholars have argued that these entities
constitute a deadweight loss on society: these entities impose costs on
society (e.g., court costs3) without creating benefits (e.g., knowledge
transfer or innovations4).
These entities have also received the attention of policymakers. In
the U.S., Congress passed the Leah-Smith America Invents Act (AIA).5
The US Government Accountability Office’s study assessed the entities’
impact on litigation volume.6 The White House published its own report
urging policymakers to temper the entities’ societal impact.7 Some states
acted,8 but their actions were limited because patentability remains a
federal question.9 These entities have drawn the interest of policymakers
in Europe, as well.10
2
Mark A. Lemley & A. Douglas Melamed, Missing the Forest for the Trolls, 113 COLUM.
L. REV. 2117, 2126 (2013). Here, the authors discuss some of the rhetoric behind patent trolls and
their enforcement of patents.
3
James Bessen & Michael J. Meurer, The Direct Costs from NPE Disputes, 99 CORNELL
L. REV. 387 (2014), In this piece, the authors estimate that non-practicing entities cost accrued $29
billions of direct costs in 2011.
4
Robin Feldman & Mark A. Lemley, Does Patent Licensing Demands Mean Innovation?,
101 IOWA L. REV. 137, 168–69 (2015) (finding that knowledge transfer—in the form of technical
knowledge, personnel transfer, and joint venture creation—do not occur when patent assertion entities
enforce patents).
5
Leah-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112–29, 125 Stat 284 (2011) (codified in
sections of 35 U.S.C. § 1 (2000)). The AIA changed the joinder rule in patent enforcement cases in
order to hinder non-practicing entity suits, which had a tendency to join multiple defendants to the
same suit in order to take advantage of economies of scale. Tracie L. Bryant, The America Invents Act:
Slaying Trolls, Limiting Joinder, 25 HARV. J. OF L. & TECH. 673 (2012).
6
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-13-465, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY:
ASSESSING FACTORS THAT AFFECT PATENT INFRINGEMENT LITIGATION COULD HELP IMPROVE
PATENT QUALITY 14 (2013) [hereinafter GAO Study]. “Congress, among others, ha[s] raised concerns
that patent infringement litigation by NPEs is increasing . . . AIA mandates that GAO conduct a study
on the consequences of patent litigation by NPEs.” Id. at 3–4.
7
Executive Office of the President, Patent Assertion and U.S. Innovation, WHITE HOUSE
(June 2013), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/docs/patent_report.pdf.
8
E.g., Ryan DeSisto, Vermont vs. the Patent Troll: Is State Action a Bridge Too Far, 48
SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 109, 123–129 (2015) (discussing the actions of Vermont policymakers in
combatting patent assertion entities).
9
Under the Patent Act, patentability remains the domain of Federal courts. 35 U.S.C. § 1
(2000). Thus, state courts can be pre-empted to deal with these Federal issues. See, e.g., Paul R.
Gugliuzza, Patent trolls and preemption, 101 VA. L. REV. 1579 (2015).
10
Europe Economics, Patent Assertion Entities in Europe: Their impact on innovation and
knowledge transfer in ICT markets, JRC SCI. FOR POL’Y REP. (Thumm, Nikolaus & Garry Gabison
eds., 2016); Dr. Luke McDonagh, Exploring Perspectives of the Unified Patent Court and Unitary
Patent within the Business and Legal Communities, A REPORT COMMISSION BY THE UK
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY OFFICE, 26–27 (2014) (investigating the potential impact of patent trolling
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Entities enforcing patents cover a broad range of issues. Not all such
entities and their enforcement behavior should be discouraged. The threat
of enforcement is a necessary part of the patent system.
The US created the Intellectual Property (IP) system to incentivize
innovation.11 This system was important enough for the writers of the U.S.
Constitution to have included it in their draft:12 the writers of the
Constitution arguably intended to create a well-functioning right to
exclude. Such functioning requires an enforcement system. Such
enforcement system may require the involvement of a public enforcer.
This paper focuses on government sponsored patent monetizing
and asserting entities.13 Patent monetizing entities (PMEs) help patent
holders license their patents to or enforce them against implementers.14
PMEs are the agents of the patent holder.15 Patent assertion entities (PAEs)
buy or license patents from inventors to license these patents to or enforce
them against implementers.16 The distinction revolves around who retains
control over the licensing or enforcement.17
This paper argues that the IP system creates two inefficiencies:
inefficient licensing and inefficient enforcement. Licensing and
enforcement raise distinct challenges that a centralized government
agency could resolve.
This paper investigates PAEs and PMEs. Section I discusses the
market failures of the patent system. First, patents can be difficult to match
with technology implementers, leaving valuable patents unexploited.
Second, patents are expensive to enforce, leading to imperfect
enforcement and free-riding opportunities, as well as rent-seeking
enforcement. Indirect governmental approaches offer the theoretical
upsides that may never realize. Direct governmental involvement could
enhance the patent system.
Section II discusses the practical examples of such involvement.
It discusses in more detail the business model of three governmental
and arguing that the effects will be minimal in the UK); Marcel de Heide, Oana van der Togt, Noëlle
Fischer, & Jos Winnink, Study on the changing role of Intellectual Property in the semiconductor
industry – including non-practicing entities, EUROPEAN COMMISSION (2014).
11

See generally GAO Study, supra note 6; Executive Office of the President, supra note
7; Heide, van der Togt, Fischer, & Winnink, supra note 10.
12
"To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to
Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries." U.S. CONST.
art. I § 8.
13
Other articles have referred to these entities as Sovereign Patent Funds; however, some
of these funds are fully autonomous. E.g., Xuan-Thao Nguyen, Sovereign Patent Funds, 51 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 1257 (2018). Section 4 discusses the difference in more detail.
14
See GAO Study, supra note 6.
15
Id.
16
Id.
17
See Nguyen, supra note 13.
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sponsored entities and their activities in the US. Scholars have heavily
criticized these entities. First, the entities do not advance market
transparency. Instead, their government sponsorship has limitations that
force the entities to behave like private PAEs. Second, the entities’ links
to governments open the door to nationalist and protectionist criticisms
(and international sanctions).
Section III argues that assuming that the IP system can incentivize
innovation, these government sponsored entities can play an important
role and the US government could implement such an entity. The USPTO
could be the prime agency to carry out this role. It already has the patent
expertise, which could be leverage. Beyond its economies of scope, such
an agency could benefit the whole industry by encouraging and
disseminating good practices in an industry often maligned.
I.

INEFFICIENT PATENT SYSTEM

The public agencies enforce private rights on a regular basis.18
Policymakers often create these public enforcers when the policymakers
want to rectify a market failure.19
US policymakers created the IP system to address such a market
inefficiency with respect to knowledge.20 Knowledge is non-rival and nonexcludable. Because it is non-excludable, inventors cannot prevent others
from implementing their creation. Because inventors cannot stop others
from using their creation, they cannot harvest the benefit of their work.
Because they cannot fully internalize the benefit of their work, they will
undersupply knowledge.
The IP system made knowledge excludable.21 Therefore,
inventors could profit from their creation, incentivizing them to supply
knowledge.22 However, by solving one inefficiency, policymakers created
an IP system laden with other market failures.

18

(2017)

19

Garry A. Gabison, Public Enforcement of Private Rights, 18 FLA. COASTAL L. REV. 207

See Nguyen, supra note 13.
Id.
See U.S. CONST. art. I § 8, infra note 22.
22
The writer of the US constitution expressed the need to incentivize inventors. They
wanted to "promote the [p]rogress of [s]cience and useful [a]rts, by securing for limited [t]imes to
[a]uthors and [i]nventors the exclusive [r]ight to their respective [w]ritings and [d]iscoveries." U.S.
CONST. art. I § 8. Some have questioned whether the patent system fixes these market inefficiencies
and some have argued that alternative systems would be more efficient. See Michele Boldrin & David
K. Levine, The Case Against Patents, 27 J. OF ECON. PERSP. 3 (2013) (arguing that a weaker patent
system leads to more innovation when controlling for the competitive environment).
20
21
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This section discusses two main issues: (1) the lack of knowledge
transfer; and (2) the inefficient patent enforcement. Then, this section
discusses what the government has attempted to do to address these
inefficiencies.
A. Failure to License IP
This section discusses how the patent system fails to encourage
innovation transfer because the demand and supply for the innovator’s
knowledge fail to meet. This section assumes that the patent holder does
not exploit his or her patent. Instead, she or he wants to monetize it.
Knowledge transfer of patented innovation generally takes two
forms: licensing and a sale. When a patent holder offers a license, she or
he can offer two types of licenses: an exclusive license and a non-exclusive
license.23 During a sale, she or he usually loses control over its exploitation
method.24 In some cases, she or he restricts the patent before it sells (e.g.

23
Exclusive license may take many forms. The patent holder may opt to grant an exclusive
license instead of selling its patent because the license remains limited in scope, e.g. territory, use,
time, etc. E.g., Waterman v. Mackenzie, 138 U.S. 252, 255 (1891) (discussing the distinction between
a license and an assignment where "[t]he patentee or his assigns may, by instrument in writing, assign,
grant, and convey, either [1st,] the whole patent, comprising the exclusive right to make, use, and vend
the invention throughout the United States; or [2nd,] an undivided part or share of that exclusive right;
or [3rd,] the exclusive right under the patent within and throughout a specified part of the United
States.").
24
Id.
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Fair Reasonable and Non-Discriminatory licensing terms,25 license before
sell,26 etc.). Table 1 summarizes these methods of patent exploitations.

Inventor's patent
ownership

Control over the knowledge transfer
Control
No Control
Non-exclusive
license (i.e.
Exclusive
Keep
directly imposed
license
restrictions)
Patent sold with
previous licensing
Sell
commitment
Unrestricted sell
(servitude-type
control)
Table 1: Patent enforcement methods

25
Intellectual property rights have been compared to real property: a bundle of rights.
Courts have recognized intellectual property rights as a bundle of rights. See, e.g., Stewart v. Abend,
495 U.S. 207, 220 (1990) (stating that “[a]n author holds a bundle of exclusive rights in the copyrighted
work, among them the right to copy and the right to incorporate the work into derivative works.”); K
Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 485 U.S. 176, 185–86 (1988) (stating that “[t]rademark law, like contract
law, confers private rights, which are themselves rights of exclusion. It grants the trademark owner a
bundle of such rights, one of which is the right to . . . bar foreign-made goods bearing that trademark.”);
Vaupel Textilmaschinen KG v. Meccanica Euro Italia SPA, 944 F.2d 870, 875 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (stating
that “[a] patent provides its owner with the right to exclude others from making, using, and selling the
claimed invention. It is, in effect, a bundle of rights which may be divided and assigned, or retained
in whole or part.”) (internal quotation omitted). The inventor can sell the whole bundle or sell only
some rights. Id. In practice, inventors can create binding agreements that run with the patent from its
inception – much like a servitude. See, e.g., Jorge L. Contreras, A Market Reliance Theory for FRAND
Commitments and Other Patent Pledges, 2 UTAH L. REV. 479, 536–38 (2015) (discussing the debate
over the treatment of FRAND like a real property servitude). For example, an inventor can participate
to a standard, declare his patent a standard essential patent (SEP), and commit to license this patent on
fair reasonable and non-discriminatory (FRAND) terms. Id. These obligations (or limitations on
enforcement) run with the patent. Id. "If a patentee can undo the FRAND commitment merely by
selling its patents to someone who has not personally made that commitment, that comfort is illusory."
Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, A Simple Approach to Setting Reasonable Royalties for StandardEssential Patents, 28 BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 1135, 1158 (2013). Thus, the court can use estoppel
principles to ensure that if the original inventor committed to certain terms, he cannot circumvent these
commitments by selling its patents. Id. at 1158–60.
26
Defensive patent aggregators offer services where they purchase patents and offer
licenses to their subscribers; to avoid that non-subscribers free-ride on their services, after granting a
license to their subscriber, they resell the patent and non-subscribers are still faced with potential
liability issues. See, e.g., Andrei Hagiu & David B. Yoffie, The New Patent Intermediaries: Platforms,
Defensive Aggregators and Super-Aggregators, 27 J. ECON. PERSP. 45, 58 (2013). This business
method has been referred as "catch-and-release." Id.

2019

GETTING WHAT YOU BARGAINED FOR

235

Patent holders often fail to license or sell their patents. One study
found that a minority of companies licenses out their patents, but
companies often wish to license more.27 Most companies cite identifying
licensing partners as the most important problem.28 Surveyed patent
holders more frequently cite matching with partners than issues
surrounding licensing fees, negotiation costs, and technology advances.29
Right holders and right exploiters have difficulty finding each other due to
transaction costs (e.g., search cost, identifying the IP holder, etc.). Because
of these transaction costs, individuals under-utilize these inventions.30
Under-utilization leads to under-compensated inventors. The undercompensation disincentivizes inventors, which was the original market
failure that the IP system sought to address.
B. Imperfect Enforcement of IP
This section focuses on the imperfect exclusory right. Patent
holders can collect licensing fees because they have the right to stop others
from using this knowledge. Without the right to exclude, the patent system
fails because patents become worthless: (1) knowledge implementers free
ride on the works of the knowledge creator; (2) inventors become less
incentivized to innovate or inventors do not file a patent and rely on trade
secrets;31 (3) either way, knowledge does not transfer.
This exclusory right is not self-enforceable. The patent holder
must actively enforce these rights through the courts and administrative
system.32 Much like licensing, assertion differs along two dimensions: (1)
who owns the intellectual property;33 and (2) who controls the enforcement
methods. Table 2 models these assertion methods.

27
Maria Pluvia Zuniga & Dominique Guellec, Who Licenses out Patents and Why?:
Lessons from a Business Survey, OECD SCI., TECH. & INDUSTRY WORKING PAPERS (2009). "27% of
Japanese companies declared to license patents to non-affiliated partners while the corresponding
figure for European is 20%." Id. at 12. Forty-five percent of European companies and 80% of Japanese
companies that already license want to license more. Id. at Table 11 & 12.
28
See also Table 13.
29
Id.
30
The Coase theorem suggests that regardless of the initial allocation, a right will end up
with the highest valuator if the initial right holder and the highest valuator can negotiate without
transaction costs. Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. L. & ECON. 1 (1960).
31
Petra Moser, Innovation without Patents: Evidence from World’s Fairs, 55 J. L. & ECON.
43 (2012) (showing that inventors have a tendency to patent more once reverse engineering becomes
easier).
32
For example, the US International Trade Commission can investigate alleged patent
infringement by imported goods pursuant to 19 U.S.C. § 1337 and the Administrative Procedure Act.
19 U.S.C. § 1337 (2004). These investigations are referred as § 337 investigations. Id.
33
While this paper focuses on the patents, entities that collect fees for their services can
enforce copyrights. See, e.g., Matthew Sag, Copyright Trolling, An Empirical Study, 100 IOWA L.
REV. 1105 (2015) (discussing PAEs in the copyright domain).
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Inventor's patent
ownership

Control over the assertion
methods
Control
No Control
Delegated
Self-assertion
Keep
assertion (e.g.,
(self-finance)
PME)
Limited
Third party
Control
Sell
assertion
(possible
(e.g., PAE)
servitude)
Table 2: Patent enforcement methods

The nuances of control and ownership may however live along a
continuum.34 Ownership determines who benefits from enforcement. The
inventor benefits if he keeps the patent; otherwise the assignee benefits.35
Control determines who directs the proceedings.36 The table depicts four
cases.
PAEs buy patents and assert them to profit.37 In some cases, PAEs
acquire patent encumbered with Fair Reasonable and Non-Discriminatory
obligations.38 With PMEs, the patent holder keeps ownership but may lose
control of the litigation.39 Beside control, the inventor may prefer selling
because it guarantees revenues whereas keeping the patent leaves the
inventor relying on an uncertain assertion strategy.40
Depending on the quadrant, the inventor carries different portions of the
enforcement costs. Since patent enforcement is costly, it cannot be
complete.41
A patent holder may not enforce a valid patent claim because the
enforcement costs outweigh the benefits. In 2013, the American
Intellectual Property Law Association reported that the median patent suit
costs about: $700,000 if less than $1 million is at risk; $2 million if $1 to
$10 million is at risk; $3.3 million if $10 to $25 million is at risk; and $5.5
34
An FTC study found that “[u]nder some agreements, patent sellers agreed to assist with
litigation, such as by making inventors available to testify, while in other agreements, the patent sellers
retained authority to control certain aspects of the litigation or licensing activity.” Federal Trade
Commission, Patent Assertion Entity Activity: an FTC Study, FTC, 49 (2016) [hereinafter FTC Study].
35
Id.
36
Id.
37
Id.
38
Id.
39
Id.
40
Id.
41
Beside litigation costs, patent holders incur other costs (e.g., infringement detection),
which make enforcement also less likely. Id.
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million if more than $25 million is at risk.42 For the low and medium value
claims, the median costs can outweigh the benefits.
To address this problem, patent holders can exploit economies of
scale. Low value claims may be privately inefficient, but a patent holder
could join multiple alleged infringers and/or infringements to save costs.
However, this joinder tactic has been associated with rent seeking
strategies43 so much so that the U.S. Congress modified the joinder rule to
stop these types of suits.44 This new joinder rule limits how a plaintiff joins
alleged patent infringers:45 it limits joinder to infringements arising out of
the same facts instead of the same patent.46 This new joinder has affected
rent seeking behaviors but it also has affected patent holders, who would
want to enforce low value claims against numerous infringers.47
Beside enforcement costs, patent holders’ budget constraints may
limit enforcement. A holder with budget constraints may not be able to
upfront the litigation costs.48 If a holder wants to circumvent its budget
constraint, then she or he may opt to use a contingency fee agreement.
For such agreement to be privately efficient for attorneys, they would need
to demand high contingency rates. For example, a low value claim of $1
million may cost $700,000 to enforce. It would be privately efficient for
the patent holder to enforce this claim because he or she would stand to
make $300,000. However, if the holder cannot upfront the $700,000, then
42
All cost information describes the costs to pursue to a case to its conclusion. David A.
Divine & Richard W. Goldstein, Report of Economic Survey 2013, AM. INTELL. PROP. L. ASS’N
(2013).
43
See GAO Study, supra note 6 and accompanying text.
44
§ 1, 125 Stat.
45
The AIA limits the joinder rule in order to address non-practicing entity suits. Bryant,
supra note 5, at 673.
46
35 U.S.C. § 299 (2013).
47
The FTC has pointed out this problem during its Section 6(b) investigation. FTC Study,
supra note 34, at 22–23.
48
"[P]atent enforcement has become financially undoable for small startup companies.
NPEs provide an avenue to protect assets that would otherwise be lost due to financial constraints."
Colleen Chien, Patent Assertion and Startup Innovation, NEW AMERICA FOUNDATION, SANTA CLARA
L. DIG. COMMONS, 3, 18 (2013). In countries like Germany, plaintiff must post a bond to enforce an
injunction. See, e.g., Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., 696 F.3d 872, 879 (9th Cir. 2012) (discussing
injunction bonds in the German system and stating that “[t]he German injunction is not self-enforcing.
According to an expert declaration on German law submitted by Motorola to the district court, to
enforce the German patent injunction, [the plaintiff] would have to post a security bond covering
potential damages to [the defendant] should the infringement ruling be reversed on appeal."). The
German injunctive relief requires that plaintiff post a bond. Id. This bond is proportionate to the harm
the injunction would cause if the defendant could reverse the decision on appeal. Id. Thus, if an SME
request an injunction against a large producing entity, it may not be able to post the bond. Id. Without
an injunction, the defendant could decide to stall the negotiations and keep infringing. Id. These bonds
can be substantial. Id. at 880. Injunction bonds aggravate the patent enforcement budget constraint
discussed previously. See generally Pierre Véron & Olivier Mandel, 20 Years of Preliminary
Injunction in French Patent Infringement Litigation, VÉRON & ASSOCIÉS (2004). They also affect
available enforcement strategies and settlement likelihood. Id. Government sponsored PMEs like
France Brevets allow patent holder to post the required injunction bonds. Id.
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the attorney would need a 70% contingency fee to justify taking on the
case. With an uncertain outcome, enforcement becomes less likely.49
Infringers may take advantage of these failures to willingly free
ride. In return, enforcement ease affects the ex-ante incentive to innovate.
C. Governmental Efforts to Address Licensing & Enforcement
Failures
For the most part, governmental efforts to address these market
failures. This section discusses these efforts and their shortcomings.
First, some governments have attempted to address the precommercial licensing costs indirectly. Pre-commercial knowledge transfer
and license often fail.50 Licensing market failure occurs when: (1)
practitioners want to license-in technological knowledge; (2) patent
holders want to license-out their technology,51 but (3) practitioners and
patent holders cannot match or come to an agreement.52
A well-functioning licensing system benefits society as a whole
because it avoids repeating research or costly work-around. In fact, some
innovation participants favor licensing.53 Policymakers have attempted to
incentivize indirectly these innovation participants.

49
A patent holder does not know how a judge or (jury) will decide a case ex-ante. Even
strong cases can be dismissed for procedural reasons. Weighing its certain litigation costs against the
expected benefits may make the suit privately inefficient or mean that attorneys request even higher
contingency fee. See FTC Study, supra note 34, at 48–49.
50
These kind of licenses have been referred to as carrot licenses. "Carrot licensing is an
active and defensive approach and the original patent owner searches for potential licensees interested
in the technology. The potential licensee does not use the patent before the licensing contract is
concluded." Frauke Rüther, PATENT AGGREGATING COMPANIES, Springer 32 (2013)(internal
quotation omitted).
51
Some in the past have argued that patents should follow the path of copyright, and
compulsory licenses should be created. See e.g. Cole M. Fauver, Compulsory Patent Licensing in the
United States: An Idea Whose Time Has Come, 8 NW. J. INT'L L. & BUS. 666 (1988). The argument in
this section assumes that patent holders wish to license out.
52
Various transaction costs hinder these matching, collaboration, and licensing activities.
Transaction costs include searching for a partner, contract drafting, etc. Zuniga, supra note 28, at 18.
Table 13 shows that difficulties in finding partners is the most cited factor of an important obstacle to
licensing.
53
Some patent holders prefer licensing-out their technology instead of practicing it. See
e.g. Alfonso Gambardella, Paola Giuri, & Alessandra Luzzi, The market for patents in Europe, 36
RESEARCH POLICY 1163 (2007)(finding that company size of the patent holders predicts their
willingness to license their patent out). Some practitioners have limited competences and resources to
devote to research. See e.g., Keld Laursen, Maria Isabella Leone, & Salvatore Torrisi, Technological
Exploration Through Licensing: New Insights From the Licensee’s Point of View, INDUSTRIAL AND
CORPORATE CHANGE, Table 1 & 3 (2010) (showing that companies that license-in are, on average,
smaller, and finding that size affects how far from existing technology a company is willing to
explore).
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For example, US policymakers have passed legislation like the
Patent and Trademark Law Amendments Act of 198054 to facilitate the
licensing and exploitation of underutilized university patents.55 It
decreases the transaction costs associated with technology licensing for
universities. Thus, the act narrowly focuses and indirectly encourages the
licensing of university patents.
Other policymakers have attempted to encourage precommercialization licensing through indirect financial incentives. For
instance, patent boxes56 are lower tax rates or tax credits for royalty
income.57 These boxes provide a marginal benefit to innovators to exploit
their patents through licenses (or to sell).58 As such, they provide a
marginal to sell and license unutilized patents.59
54

Pub. L. 96–517 (1980). Also known as the Bayh-Dole Act.
Ashley J. Stevens, The Enactment of Bayh–Dole, 29 J. TECH. TRANSFER 93, 95
(2004)(discussing the history of the Bayh-Dole act).
56
Patent boxes get their name from the box a taxpayer needs to tick to assert incomes from
IP exploitation. Robert D. Atkinson & Scott Andes, Patent Boxes: Innovation in Tax Policy and Tax
Policy for Innovation (Info. Tech. & Innovation Found., Washington, D.C.), Oct. 2011, at 7–8,
available at http://www.itif.org/files/201 l-patent-box-final.pdf (last visited Feb. 24, 2016).
57
Patent boxes, or innovation boxes, can encompass more than royalties. Depending on the
jurisdiction, they can encompass all intellectual property related income and may not even require
invention patenting. These must not be confused with R&D tax incentives, which come at the R&D
stage, whereas patent box tax benefits come at the exploitation stage. See e.g. Michael J. Graetz &
Rachael Doud, Technological Innovation, International Competition, and the Challenges of
International Income Taxation, 113 COLUMBIA L. REV. 347, 362–75 (2013).
58
The box requirements vary greatly from country to country. Some countries allow for
the tax benefits to be claimed by inventors who exploit their own patents (embedded licenses), while
other tax regimes limt the tax benefit to pure licensing revenues. See e.g. PwC, Global Research &
Development Incentives Group, (2015) https://www.pwc.com/gx/en/tax/assets/pwc-global-r-and-dbrochure-may-2015.pdf; PwC, Patent Box and Technology Incentives: Tax and Financial Reporting
Considerations, (2015) https://www.pwc.com/us/en/tax-accounting-services/assets/pwc-patent-boxand-technology-incentives-tax-and-reporting-considerations.pdf; Qantria Strategies, Patent Boxes,
Technological Innovation and Implications for Corporate Tax Reform, (2015) Retrieved from
American Action Forum: http://americanactionforum.org/research/patent-boxes-technologicalinnovation-and-implications-for-corporate (last visited Feb. 24, 2016).
59
The history of patent boxes show that they have been implemented for indirect
protectionist reasons. These patent boxes first appeared in Europe. Ireland passed its first patent box
in 1973. The year coincided with Ireland assenting into the European Union. To claim the patent box
regime, the R&D behind the patent had to be performed in Ireland. The European Commission asserted
this same argument when it opposed the Irish patent box. In 2007, the European Commission
"requested Ireland to change its tax law provision by which patent royalties are tax exempt only if
research leading to the patent was carried out in Ireland" because the Irish nexus approach "is
incompatible with the freedom of establishment and the free movement of services." European
Commission, Direct Taxation: Commission Requests Ireland to End Discriminatory Rules on Tax
Treatment of Patent Royalties, (Mar. 23, 2007) Retrieved from European Commission:
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-07-408_en.htm?locale=en (last visited Feb. 24, 2016). So, the
Irish patent box was arguably implemented to incentivize R&D centers not to move to other European
Member States. Patent boxes have been heavily criticized as a form of tax competition. Ireland
implemented in 1973 and eliminated its patent boxes in 2010. After France in 2000, the patent box
proliferation sped up among European Member States. In the next decade, five Member States passed
comparable legislation – namely Hungary (2003), Belgium (2007), the Netherlands (2007), Spain
(2008), and Luxembourg (2008). Since then, Malta (2010), Cyprus (2012), the UK (2013), and
Portugal (2014) also enacted a patent box tax law. See Qantria Strategies, supra note 58.
55
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The impact on knowledge transfer remains unclear: the countries
implementing these boxes have not benefited through tax revenues60 and
their impact on patenting and patent-licensing/sales has not been
measured.61
Second, some governments have attempted to address the
enforcement costs by including attorney's fees recovery as a remedy. In
some US jurisdictions and the EU system,62 IP holders can already recover
attorney's fees in case of success. However, in other legal areas, adding
attorney’s fees have not corrected the suboptimal enforcement. For
example, in employment discrimination cases, recovery of attorney's fees
failed to incentivize plaintiffs to optimally enforce their rights.63
Indirect efforts to encourage pre-commercialization licensing and postcommercialization enforcement, have left room for improvement. Some
governments have taken more direct actions.
First, some governments are already targeting precommercialization market failures. For example, the Korean government
created the Korean Integrated Contract Manufacturing Service. This
government initiative helps small and medium (SME) enterprises "diffuse
their innovative technologies."64 This initiative has helped many SMEs
defeat (pre-commercialization) matching failures.

60
For the implementing countries, the impact on tax revenues has been on average
negative. A patent box regime has two effects on its IP income tax revenues: (1) IP income tax
revenues decrease because companies already paying IP income taxes in the implementing country
are now paying a lower tax rate; (2) IP income tax revenues increase because companies that were not
paying IP income taxes in this country may be willing to relocate their IP management to take
advantage of the lower rates. Counterfactual studies have attempted to test these effects. They used a
discrete choice model to determine how each company decides where to locate their IP management.
They found that companies respond to IP tax regime changes and they relocate where their IP was
held. Rachel Griffith, Helen Miller, & Martin O'Connell, Ownership of Intellectual Property and
Corporate Taxation, 111 J. PUBLIC ECON. 12 (2014). Another study found similar impact on patenting
location. See also, Annette Alstadsæter, Salvador Barrios, Gaetan Nicodeme, Agnieszka Maria
Skonieczna, & Antonio Vezzani, Patent Boxes Design, Patents, Location and Local R&D, European
Commission (2015) https://ec.europa.eu/jrc/sites/default/files/JRC96080_Patent_boxes.pdf (last
visited Feb. 24, 2016).
61
The Griffith et al. study and the Alstadsæter et al. study both assume that the patenting
behavior is unaffected by these patent boxes. Id. They instead test where patenting occurs assuming
that patent will occur in one of the jurisdictions of choice. A counterfactual addressing the overall
impact on patenting has not been performed.
62
See e.g., Garry A. Gabison, Lessons that Europe can Learn From the US Patent
Assertion Entity Phenomenon, 24 INFO. & COMM. TECH. L. 278, 289–92 (2015).
63
Gabison, supra note 18.
64
Sungjoo Lee, Gwangman Park, Byungun Yoon, & Jinwoo Park, Open Innovation in
SMEs – An Intermediated Network Model, 39 RESEARCH POLICY 290, 296–99 (2010).
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The Korean government also founded a PME, Intellectual
Discovery, in 2010.65 In 2012, it acquired a portfolio of 244 patents from
Avago Technology, a Singapore based chipmaker.66 Later that year,
Intellectual Discovery sold to Google a patent entitled "Personal viewing
device with system for providing identification information to a connected
system."67 This patent was later incorporated into the Google Glasses
commercialized in 2013.68 This transfer exemplifies successful precommercialization transfers where government sponsored PMEs played
an active role. In this case, Intellectual Discovery just flipped the patents
more than they acted as a broker between Avago and Google; nonetheless,
they made the deal possible. Other public centralized entities can play that
role.
These centralized entities are common in copyright in both the US
private and public sector. For example, in the U.S. sound recording
industry, three private entities act as centralized bargaining agent and offer
blanket licenses.69 They collect the fees on behalf of songwriters,
composers, and music publishers. They later distribute these fees in the
form of royalties to their members according to performance frequency.70
In the public sector, the U.S. policymakers have assigned the U.S.
Copyright Office to act as the central entity. U.S. policymakers have
created statutory compulsory licenses.71 These compulsory licenses72
65
Company>History,
INTELLECTUAL
DISCOVERY,
http://www.idiscovery.com/site/kr/overview/history.jsp (last visited Jan. 2019).
66
Dan Levine and Miyoung Kim, Insight: Nation-states Enter Contentious Patent-buying
Business, Reuters (Mar. 20, 2013) http://in.reuters.com/article/us-patents-nations-insightidUSBRE92J07B20130320 (last visited July 29, 2016).
67
US Patent 6,735,328 filed on March 7, 2000 and granted on May 11, 2004. The patent
filing shows that the original assignee was Agilent Technologies, Inc. (Palo Alto, CA). Avago
Technologies was bought in 2000 and then divested by Agilent Technologies in 2006. Jeffrey
McCracken, Alex Sherman & Ian King, Avago to Buy Broadcom for $37 Billion in Biggest Tech Deal
Ever, BLOOMBERG (May 27, 2015). http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-05-27/avagosaid-near-deal-to-buy-wireless-chipmaker-broadcom (last visited July 29, 2016). Through the sale,
Avago Technologies kept some of the patents, which were later sold to Intellectual Discovery. The
USPTO record shows that US Patent 6,735,328 has been transferred to Google, Inc. on November 16,
2012.
68
Bill Slawski, Google Acquires Patent For Eye Scan Security And Augmented Imagery,
SEO BY THE SEA (Jan. 12, 2013), http://www.seobythesea.com/2013/01/eye-scan-securityaugmented-imagery/.
69
These three entities are Broadcast Music Incorporated, American Society of Composers,
Authors and Publishers, and SESAC, which stands for Society of European Stage Authors and
Composers.
70
Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 441 US 1 (1979)
(discussing the sound recording industry business model).
71
17 U.S. Code § 115.
72
Compulsory license seekers must file a notice with the Copyright Office. The Copyright
Office then collects compulsory license royalties for copyright holders. Later, it later redistributes
these fees to right holders. See e.g. Nat'l Ass'n of Broadcasters v. Librarian of Congress, 146 F.3d
907, 912–13 (D.D.C. 1998) (discussing the functioning of compulsory licensing collection and
distribution).
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avoid the matching73 issue and holdup problem associated with licensing
negotiations.74
This system has been criticized as inefficient. First, compulsory
licensing rates create market ceiling.75 This ceiling incentivizes
individuals seeking compulsory licenses to negotiate longer:76 the
statutory licensing fee acts as a holdout mechanism. Second, the
compulsory licensing system can be slow and resource intensive.77
In copyright context, these private right aggregators provide an
example of a well-functioning system that enable licensing. In spite of the
criticisms, the government agency serves as complement to their efforts.
Comparable centralized entities are rarer in the patent context. For
example, patent pools aggregate patents and license the pooled portfolio
to willing practitioners. These patents are usually technology-related or
complementary.78 This idiosyncrasy limits their proliferation to
complementary technologies.79
Second, some governments has also taken direct actions with
respect to post-commercialization infringement. For example, the French
government created a PME, France Brevets, in 2010.80 France Brevets

73
This system addresses matching failure. When the copyright holder cannot be ascertained
(i.e. orphan works), the Copyright Office collects the fees on behalf of the unknown rightful owner.
See e.g. Robert Kirk Walker, Negotiating the Unknown: a Compulsory Licensing Solution to the
Orphan Works Problem, 35 CARDOZO L. REV. 35 (2014) (discussing the benefits of having
compulsory licenses for orphan works).
74
Because copyrighted works are not homogenous, some parties have larger bargaining
powers. The asymmetric bargaining power can lead to socially efficient deals to fail.
75

See e.g. Howard B. Abrams, Copyright's First Compulsory License, 26 SANTA CLARA
HIGH TECH. L.J. 215 (2009).
76
See e.g. Karen Hsieh, Unlock the Music: Replacing Compulsory Music Licenses with
Free Market Negotiation, 17 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 595 (2015).
77
See U.S. Copyright Office, Copyright and the Music Marketplace: A Report of the
Register of Copyrights, 107 (Feb. 2015) http://copyright.gov/docs/musiclicensingstudy/copyrightand-the-music-marketplace.pdf (discussing the concerns expressed by respondent to a public
consultation).
78
Carl Shapiro, Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross Licenses, Patent Pools, and Standard
Setting, 1 INNOVATION POLICY & ECON., 119, 127–28 (2001).
79
Anne Layne-Farrar & Josh Lerner, To Join or Not to Join: Examining Patent Pool
Participation and Rent Sharing Rules, 29 INTERNATIONAL J. INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 294
(2011)(discussing some of the dynamics behind patent holders' willingness to participate in a patent
pool). These pools benefit practitioners as well as patent holders. Paul J. Heald, A Transaction Costs
Theory of Patent Law, 66 OHIO ST. L. J. 473, 495 (2005).
80
In 2010, the French government created its PME, France Brevets. "Constituée en mars
2010 sous la forme d’une société par actions simplifiée, France Brevets est dotée d’un capital de 100
M€ à terme, à parité entre la Caisse des dépôts agissant pour le compte de l’Etat dans le cadre du
Programme d’Investissements d’Avenir et la Caisse des Dépôts intervenant pour son compte propre"
which translates to: Established in March 2010 as a joint stock company, France Brevets has a capital
of €100 million which were invested in equal shares by la Caisse des dépôts on behalf of the State as
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sued HTC in the U.S.81 The government sponsored PME directly enforced
the rights of its clients.
In other context (e.g., employment or housing discrimination),
U.S. policymakers have directly intervened when rights were underenforced.82 Policymakers filled the enforcement gap by creating a public
enforcement agency. The same could be done with patent enforcement in
the US. The next section discusses in more detail the actions of
government-backed PMEs.
II.

GOVERNMENT SPONSORED PMES

This section discusses three government sponsored PMEs: South
Korea's Intellectual Discovery; Japan’s IP Bridge; and France’s France
Brevets.
A. Intellectual Discovery
Intellectual Discovery was created in 2010 “to evaluate and
invests in IP owned by entities and to provide the entities with direct or
indirect benefits.”83 Intellectual Discovery has been involved in the most
transactions of the three.84 Searching its US patent portfolio shows that
Intellectual Discovery registered three hundred and twenty-three unique
transactions as the assignee of patent transactions and 16 as the assignor
of patents.85
The three hundred and twenty-three patent transactions are
divided into three types of transaction: exclusive licenses, licensing
agreements, and patent assignments. Intellectual Discovery registered two
hundred and twenty-two exclusive licensing agreements, ninety-two
licensing agreements, and one thousand one hundred and ninety-one
patent assignments. Table 3 shows the distribution of agreements where

part of the Program on Investments for the Future and la Caisse des dépôts acting for its own account.
(author's translation) http://www.caissedesdepots.fr/france-brevets-0 (last visited Jul. 23 2016).
81
NFC Technology, LLC v. HTC America, et al., 2:13-CV-01058-JRG (ED Tex. 2013).
"NFC Technology, LLC ("NFCT"), a Delaware limited liability corporation with its principal place of
business in Marshall, Texas. NFCT is a wholly-owned indirect subsidiary of France Brevets" NXP
Semiconductors USA, Inc. v. France Brevets, SAS, No. C 14-1225 SI (ND Cal. 2014).
82
Gabison, supra note 18.
83
http://www.i-discovery.com/site/en/overview/aboutid.jsp (last visited Sep. 20, 2018).
See also, Nguyen, supra note 13, at 1266-67 for more details.
84
Jack Ellis, Intellectual Discovery May be the Biggest of the Sovereign Patent Funds, but
its Activities are the Least Known, INTELL. ASSET MNGT. (May 27, 2016), http://www.iammedia.com/blog/detail.aspx?g=c13bfd7c-9f0b-4496-80c7-913518233bd1 (last visited Aug. 2, 2016).
85
All pertinent information was extracted from http://assignment.uspto.gov/ on July 31,
2016.
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Intellectual Discovery was the assignee.86 The country is based on the
origin of the assignor.
Table 3: Patent transactions with Intellectual Discovery as patent
assignee
Country of assignor
(major contributor)
South Korea
(SK Hynix Inc.)
(Samsung)
(Elec. & Telecom.
Research Inst.)
United States
(IBM)
All Other
(Avago, Singapore)
Total

Exclusive licensing
agreement
211
95%
(0)
(0%)
(0)
(0%)
(166)
(75%)

Licensing
agreement
92
100%
(0)
(0%)
(0)
(0%)
(79)
(86%)

Patent assignment
810
(104)
(99)
(86)

68%
(9%)
(8%)
(7%)

11
(0)
0
(0)
222

0
(0)
0
(0)
92

217
(143)
164
(135)
1191

18%
(12%)
14%
(11%)
100%

5%
(0%)
0%
(0%)
100%

0%
(0%)
0%
(0%)
100%

As of July 31, 2016
source: USPTO
This data shows that Intellectual Discovery favored assignments
over licensing agreements: 79% of transactions are assignments, 15% are
exclusive licenses, and 6% are licenses. So, Intellectual Discovery acts
more like a PAE in the United States (acquiring patents) than a PME
(licensing patents).
Intellectual Discovery agreed with entities from South Korea, the
United States, Singapore, Canada, and Japan. Its network could explain
the predominance of agreements with South Korean patent holders. Since
it is a Korean based entity, it has a comparative advantage in contacting
Korea-based patent holders.
The origin of the patent provides an interesting look into its
business model. First, most contributions come either from large research
institutes or individuals associated with universities and research centers.
Intellectual Discovery registered three hundred and thirty-one patents
transferred from Electronics & Telecommunications Research Institute:
86
Note that patent assignments can be registered under 35 U.S. Code § 261. Any failure to
register transaction does not terminate or forfeit the transaction. Instead, it protects against subsequent
claims acting like a race statute. Therefore, every assignment to and by Intellectual Discovery may not
be recorded. In general, PAEs seem to register their patents. The FTC study found that about 95.5%
of acquired patents are recorded with the USPTO and about 66.9% are recorded within 90 days of
acquisition date. FTC Study, supra note 34, 144–46. Therefore, looking at the USPTO records can
provide valuable information about PAE activities.
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eighty-six were assignments, one hundred and sixty-six were exclusive
licenses, and seventy-nine were licenses.87 Gwangju Institute of Science
and Technology assigned twenty-four patents to Intellectual Discovery.88
Over eighty patents were assigned from different research centers and
industry-academy cooperation groups. Beside these large assignments,
about 15% of patents came from individual inventors with ties to research
centers and universities.
Universities and research centers play an important role in their
business model. About a third of the patents assigned to Intellectual
Discovery come from universities and research institutes. About 87% of
the exclusive licenses come from research institutes, which include eleven
patents licensed by Arizona State University. All the license agreements
come from South Korean universities and research institutes.
Second, contributions from the private sector usually come from
large practicing companies. From South Korea, Intellectual Discovery was
assigned one hundred and four patents from SK Hynix89 and ninety-nine
patents from Samsung.90 In the US, it was assigned one hundred and fortythree patents from IBM.91 From Singapore, it was assigned one hundred
and thirty-five patents from Avago.92 These assigning companies may not
exploit the patents because they fall outside their practicing areas. Instead,
they decided to monetize them through Intellectual Discovery.
As an assignor, Intellectual Discovery only conducted
assignments of rights. It conducted 16 transactions involving fifty-four
patents: six transactions involved Korean companies and twenty-six
patents; four transactions involved US companies and twenty-two patents;
and six involved Hong Kong companies and six patents (

Table 4).93
87
Reel Frames 30418-587, 32242-407, 29589-357, 32456-991, 29343-203, 31171-898,
30831-249, 31615-770, 30695-272, 34594-283, 34594-229, 34594-461, 34077-862, 34594-15, 34594115, 29343-196 completed in 2012, 2013, and 2014.
88
Reel Frames 26198-918, 35218-758, 37285-602, 33630-12, 37285-618, 35357-835,
38316-94, 39193-105 completed from 2011 to 2016.
89
Reel Frames 32421-488 and 30471-480 completed in 2013 and 2014.
90
Reel Frames 34151-504, 29776-256, 29776-78, 29776-178, 29775-973, 29761-694, and
29776-463 completed in 2013 and 2014.
91
Reel Frames 30596-562, 30624-719, 32007-568, 30628-554, and 34849-203 completed
in 2013 and 2014.
92
Reel Frames 28972-733, 28968-296, and 28995-175 completed in 2012.
93
All the HK transactions were with Golden Valley Holdings. Reel Frames 38738-707,
38739-42, 38738-769, 38738-553, 38739-180, and 38738-881 completed in 2016.
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Table 4: Patent assignments with Intellectual Discovery as patent
assignor
Country of assignee
(major contributor)
South Korea
(Hyundai
Motor
Comp.)
(Neolab
Convergence Inc.)
United States
(XCSR, LLC)
(Game and Tech.
Co.)
(CTSI Co.)
Hong Kong
(Golden
Valley
Holdings)
Total

26
(18)

48%
(33%)

(6)

(11%)

22
(9)
(8)

41%
(17%)
(15%)

(4)
6
(6)

(7%)
11%
(11%)

54

100%

As of July 31, 2016
source: USPTO
These transactions show that Intellectual Discovery does not
license (or at least has not registered its licensing agreements). Thus, it
confirms that it behaves more like a PAE than a licensing PME as an
assignor as well.
These transactions also illustrate that Intellectual Discovery
acquires and assigns patents to non-Korea entities. Some questions were
raised about some of its transactions.94 Since 2016, Intellectual Discovery

94
Jack Ellis, Patents linked to South Korea’s Intellectual Discovery asserted in Eastern
Texas litigation, INTELL. ASSET MGMT. (Oct. 26, 2015) (discussing the suits filed by Game and
Technology against Blizzard Entertainment, Riot Games, Valve and Wargamingnet involving patents
that were assigned to Game and Technology by Intellectual Discovery) http://www.iammedia.com/blog/detail.aspx?g=e5c2b3e8-3c40-4d9d-836d-6becd30ff516 (last visited Aug. 2, 2016).
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has divested part of its portfolio.95 This came after the former CEO
complained about budget cuts.96
B. IP Bridge
IP Bridge is a Japanese government sponsored PME founded in
2013.97 It hopes to prevent free riding.98 It received funds from public and
private entities.99 It aims to serve SMEs and startups, universities and
research centers, as well as large companies.100
IP Bridge has a comparable portfolio to Intellectual Discovery. Its
behavior, nonetheless, seems more focused on Japanese held patents. In
the US, IP Bridge was involved in thirty-six unique transactions as an
assignee with entities from Japan and one entity from the United States
(Table 5).101 These thirty-six transactions involved one thousand two
hundred and twenty six patents, of which nine hundred and fifty were
assigned by Panasonic,102 one hundred by NEC,103 and eighty-eight by
Sanyo.104 Contrary to Intellectual Discovery, IP Bridge has not registered
any licensing agreements.
Table 5: Patent transactions with IP Bridge
Country of assignor
& assignee
(major contributor)
Japan
(Panasonic)
(NEC)
(Sanyo Elec.)

IP Bridge Assignee

IP Bridge Assignor

1184
(950)
(100)
(88)

38
(21)
(0)
(17)

97%
(77%)
(8%)
(7%)

100%
(55%)
(0%)
(45%)

95
Jacob Schindler, Intellectual Discovery offloads another portfolio and narrows business
focus in new CEO’s first year, INTELL. ASSET MGMT. (Dec. 18, 2017). https://www.iammedia.com/litigation/intellectual-discovery-offloads-another-portfolio-and-narrows-business-focusnew (last visited Sep. 20, 2018).
96
Jacob Schindler, More upheaval in the SPF sector as Intellectual Discovery CEO
resigns, INTELL. ASSET MNGT. (Oct. 27, 2016). https://www.iam-media.com/litigation/moreupheaval-spf-sector-intellectual-discovery-ceo-resigns (last visited Sep. 20, 2018).
97
Nguyen, supra note 13, at 1263–66 for more details.
98
Id.
99
Bruce Einhorn, Asia Is Getting Its Own Patent Police, BLOOMBERG (July 8, 2016)
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-07-08/xiaomi-huawei-and-others-seek-tech-patentinfringement-fees; http://ipbridge.co.jp/en/about (last visited July 29, 2016).
100
IP BRIDGE, http://ipbridge.co.jp/eng/ (last visited Oct. 22, 2016).
101
IP Bridge was assigned 42 patents from Visteon Global Technologies in in 2015 (Reel
Frame 35421-739).
102
Reel Frames 35968-223, 35510-59, 35509-804, 35003-660, 33161-573, 32268-568,
32205-550, 32204-693, 32197-273, 32054-628, 32028-105, 32094-311, 31954-554, 31953-882,
31953-393, 31950-683, 31903-183, 32152-514, 32209-63, 36054-104, 36036-705, 35695-16, 35510335, and 35003-750 completed between 2013 and 2015.
103
Reel Frame 34834-806 completed in 2014.
104
Reel Frames 32077-337, 32153-515, 31736-80, 31736-69, 31771-485, and 31771-436.
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United States
(Visteon
Global
Tech. Inc.)
Total

42
(42)

3%
(3%)

0
(0)

0%
(0%)

1226

100%

38

100%

As of July 31, 2016
source: USPTO
IP Bridge was involved in two unique transactions as an assignor
with entities from Japan (i.e. Panasonic and Sanyo). These assignments
involved thirty-eight patents.
IP Bridge was more open about its litigation strategy.105 It brought
suits in the US against TCL Corporation, a Chinese electronic
manufacturer,106 Broadcom Limited,107 Intel,108 two American
semiconductor manufacturers, and Omnivision Technologies, an
American electronic developer.109 IP Bridge continues to litigate its
patents. It recorded some successes.110
C. France Brevets
France Brevets has the smallest portfolio of these three entities.
France Brevets aimed “to build strategic patent positions and monetize
them through effective and focused licensing efforts”111 and to help SMEs
who seek to license their innovation.112
105
Bing Zhao, Five years after its founding, IP Bridge reflects Japan’s changing approach
to patents, INTELL. ASSET MNGT. (quoting the vice president stating that “Our licensing policy is to
negotiate in good faith and offer a reasonable royalty. [ . . . ] some possible licensees refuse to take a
licence. [ . . . ] In such cases, we have no choice but to ask courts to decide on whether we are right or
not.”) https://www.iam-media.com/finance/five-years-after-its-founding-ip-bridge-reflects-japanschanging-approach-patents (last visited Sep. 20, 2018).
106
Godo Kaisha IP Bridge 1 v. TCL Communication Technology Holdings Limited et al,
1:15-cv-00634 (D. Del. 2015).
107
Godo Kaisha IP Bridge 1 v. Broadcom Limited et al, 2:16-cv-00134 (ED. Tex. 2016).
108
Godo Kaisha IP Bridge 1 v. Intel Corporation, 2:17-cv-00676 (ED. Tex 2017).
109
Godo Kaisha IP Bridge 1 v. OmniVision Technologies, Inc., 1:16-cv-00290 (D. Del.
2016).
110
Ambrogio Visconti, Intel Corporation v. Godo Kaisha IP Bridge, THE GLOBAL
CHRONICLE (Sep. 19, 2018) http://www.globallegalchronicle.com/intel-corporation-v-godo-kaishaip-bridge/ (last visited Sep 20, 2018).
111
FRANCE BREVETS, http://www.francebrevets.com/en (last visited Jul. 23, 2016).
112
Convention du 2 septembre 2010 entre l'Etat, l'Agence nationale de la recherche et la
Caisse des dépôts et consignations relative au programme d'investissements d'avenir (action «France
Brevets»),
JORF
n°0205
page
16153
(Sept.,
4
2010)
http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/eli/convention/2010/9/2/PRMX1022556X/jo/texte (last visited Jul. 23,
2016). France Brevets, according to its expressed goals, aims at helping small and medium size
companies to raise revenues from intellectual property and at providing them with the means to secure
licenses. As such, France Brevets asserts that it champions the interests of the small and give the
example of one company: “Laurent Tonnelier’s testimonial, CEO of mobiLead, a French start-up
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Until July 2016, it was involved in fewer transactions. In the US,
France Brevets was involved in twenty-one unique transactions as an
assignee with entities from France, Italy, Switzerland, Spain, German,
Finland, Korea, and United States. These twenty-one transactions
involved one hundred and eighty-seven patents. France Brevets registered
one licensing agreement involving one patent. The other twenty
transactions are assignments.113
Table 6: Patent transactions with France Brevets
Country of
assignor/assignee
(major contributor)
Europe
(STMicroelectronics
Int.’l NV,
Netherlands)114
(Thomson Licensing,
France)
(CDC Propriete
Intellectuelle, France)
(Intuilab)
United States
(EMS Technologies)
(Clean Energy
Management
Solution LLC)
South Korea
LG Electronics
Total

France Brevets
Patent Assignee

France
Brevets
Patent Assignor

176
(95)

95%
(51%)

0
(0)

0%
(0%)

(40)

(22%)

(0)

(0%)

(17)

(9%)

(0)

(0%)

(0)
5
(5)
(0)

(0)
3%
(3%)
(0%)

(0)
5
(0)
(5)

(0%)
100%
(0%)
(100%)

4
(4)
185*

2%
(2%)
100%

0
(0)
5**

0%
(0%)
100%

As of July 31, 2016
*
Not included: France Brevets registered that it was assigned one license
and one partial patent assignment
**
Not included: France Brevets registered that it assigned a security
interest in a patent
source: USPTO
France Brevets was involved in two transactions as an assignor
with an entity from the United States and France.115 These assignments
involved six patents: five patent assignments and one security interest.
creating outstanding innovations in the Internet of Things field. Its founder, and inventor of the new
generation of QR Code, is recognizing France Brevets for its professional technical expertise and long
term vision.” (last visited Jul. 23, 2016).
113
One assignment was a partial assignment (Reel Frame 32736-586).
114
STMicroelectronics is a multinational incorporated in the Netherlands, with
headquarters in Switzerland, and set-up and owned in part by the French and Italian government.
115
One assignment was a security interest (Reel Frame 34662-393).
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France Brevets sued HTC in the US through a subsidiary, NFC
Technology, LLC.116 The use of this subsidiary creates an added layer of
opacity—even if France Brevets attempts to disclose other valuable
information during the suit.117 France Brevets sued HTC in Germany
under its own name.118 France Brevets collected patents under its own
name. Since its inception, France Brevets seems to focus on postcommercialization licensing instead of pre-commercialization licensing.
Contrary to Intellectual Ventures, IP Bridge and France Brevets mostly
received patent assignments from companies or inventors from their home
territory.119 Ninety-seven and ninety-five percent of patents assigned come
respectively from Japan and Europe.120 IP Bridge has only assigned
patents to Japanese companies. France Brevets have only assigned patents
to US companies.121
In 2018, France Brevets has collaborated with Qualcomm and IP
Europe to help SMEs build a portfolio from filing to enforcing.122 France
Brevets is attempting to live up to its mission statement of helping SMEs.
France Brevets favors a licensing scheme where they receive a share of
the royalties instead of purchasing patents to assert.123
III.

IS IT TIME FOR A US SPONSORED PME?

Since their inception, government-sponsored PMEs have raised
concerns. Their detractors present two main arguments: (1) these entities
fail to reach their stated goals and (2) these entities present a threat to
international trade. This section discusses these two arguments in more
detail after discussing why the USPTO could join the market.

116

See supra note 81.
Nguyen, supra note 13, at 1274–75(discussing France Brevets’ business methods).
118
France Brevets ./. HTC (LG Düsseldorf, 4b O 140/13, March 26th, 2015).
119
Because of European Union rules, France Brevets cannot (openly) discriminate between
European Member States and did not seem to have. As such, this conversation uses home territory to
describe Europe for France Brevets.
120
In the case of France Brevets, the relevant territory seems to be Europe. France Brevets
received a large share of patents from French entities. But it is difficult to classify companies like
STMicroelectronics.
121
See France Breverts, supra note 118.
122
Joff Wild, Qualcomm, France Brevets and IP Europe join forces to create a new funding
initiative for European SMEs, INTELL. ASSET MNGT. (Jun 22, 2018), https://www.iammedia.com/finance/qualcomm-france-brevets-and-ip-europe-join-forces-create-new-fundinginitiative.
123
Nguyen, supra note 13, at 1280–81.
117
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A. New Role for the USPTO
Governmental efforts to create efficient patent markets have
yielded ambiguous results. The US government should do more. After all,
the Constitution specifies that Congress has the power “[t]o promote the
progress of science and useful arts, by securing for limited times to authors
and inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings and
discoveries.”124
This inclusion signals that the founding fathers perceived the IP
system as an important tool to incentivize science and the useful arts. In
many ways, the current IP system fails to reach this goal. Under the current
system, the US government grants exclusive rights but does not secure
those rights for authors and inventors. Without such security, these authors
and inventors are not incentivized to promote science and useful arts.
The US government should consider tasking the USPTO with
creating its own PME. First, the USPTO has a comparative advantage as
a pre-commercial agent for patent holders. The USPTO has a monopoly
in patent granting. During patent prosecution, patent examiners investigate
prior-art.125 As such, the investigating examiner should be familiar with
related applications. During prosecution, the examiner could flag potential
matches. Similarly, the USPTO could evaluate patent value. Economies of
scope could be created by joining granting services with valuation
services.126
Such a centralized agency decreases transaction costs. First, the
USPTO would decrease searching costs between willing licensees and
licensors because collaborators can meet in a single venue. Second, the
USPTO could decrease negotiation costs because of their economies of
scale and learning by doing.127 The USPTO could help even out the
124

U.S. CONST, art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
Under 35 U.S.C. §§ 102–103.
126
A similar argument has been made with regard to essentiality: patent offices could
perform essentiality tests and generate economies of scope. Currently, essentiality tests are only
performed in the case of patent pool. Standard developing organizations have benefited from
cooperating with patent offices to assess essentiality of patents and to avoid patent ambush. See, e.g.,
Rudi Bekkers and Andrew Updegrove, A study of IPR policies and practices of a representative group
of Standards Setting Organizations worldwide, US National Academies of Science, Board of Science,
Technology,
and
Economic
Policy,
66
(2012)
http://sites.nationalacademies.org/cs/groups/pgasite/documents/webpage/pga_072197.pdf
(last
visited Jul. 23, 2016) (discussing the cooperation efforts between European Telecommunications
Standards Institute and the European Patent Office to create a database of declared standard essential
patents).
127
A government-sponsored PME can provide important pricing expertise. Licensing fees
can be complicated to set. Even post-commercialization, courts struggle to set the royalty base and
rate. Pre-commercialization patent holders and practitioners can underestimate the value of the
patented feature. Sophisticated contracts can, nonetheless, account for future product success. Federal
courts have advanced different theories to set royalty base and rate. For royalty base, the two primary
theories are “entire market value rule” and “smallest salable patent practicing unit.” If a patented aspect
125
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bargaining power between small innovators and large implementers
because they could suggest standard royalty/licensing terms and sell
terms.128 Third, the USPTO could also leverage its mandate to suggest
cross-technology enhancement to willing licensors. These economies of
scope would not exist in comparable private entities like patent pools.
The USPTO mandate could also be more limited to helping small
innovators who lack the licensing network or focusing on precommercialization. The USPTO already offers small fees for small and
micro entities because it recognizes the budget constraint and difficulties
these entities face.129
Regardless, the USPTO as a PME could encourage best
practices.130 Competition often encourage companies to cut corners (e.g.,
shame litigations). The USPTO could be isolated from market pressures
because its patent granting services ensure that it remains self-sustainable.
Beside pre-commercialization licensing, the USPTO could help with precommercial sales. Patent holders often struggle to set appropriate prices

of a product cannot be distinguished from the product and its desirability, then the court usually uses
the entire market value rule of the final product as the royalty base. If it is distinguishable, the court
will go down to a production product until it cannot be distinguished. This sub-product would become
the smallest salable patent practicing unit. See, e.g., Zelin Yang, Damaging Royalties: An Overview
of Reasonable Royalty Damages. 29 BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 647 (2014); J. Gregory Sidak, The proper
royalty base for patent damages, J. COMP. L. & ECON. (2014) doi: 10.1093/joclec/nhu030. For royalty
rate, courts usually investigate a set of factors enumerated in Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. United States
Plywood Corp., 318 F. Supp. 1116 (SDNY 1970).
128
This section does not argue that the USPTO should follow the Copyright example with
compulsory licenses. Instead, the patent holders could opt into this system and could set the royalty
they want as a measure of the final product value. Post-commercialization market failures affect precommercialization market failures. Small innovators usually have little bargaining power as compare
to large implementers. After all, a potential licensor could decide that it does not need a license after
all and instead infringe and wait for suit. Since small innovators experience budget constraints, their
hollow threat of litigation offers little bargaining power and leverage to get a (stick) license. To work
efficiently, a patent system requires that all social beneficial innovations are incentivized regardless
of the innovators post-patenting bargaining power.
129
35 U.S.C. § 41(h).
130
For example, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has encouraged such best practices.
The FTC investigated MPHJ Technology Investments, LLC, an alleged PAE. In re MPHJ Tech. Inv.
LLC, F.T.C. Matter No. 142-3003 (F.T.C. Nov. 6, 2014). After filing a suit, the FTC reached a
settlement with MPHJ. MPHJ Technology Investments, LLC, Jay Mac Rust, and Farney Daniels, P.C.;
Analysis to Aid Public Comment, 79 Fed. Reg. 67,435, 67,436 (proposed Nov. 13, 2014). The FTC
authority rested its case on its consumer protection mandate. Section 5(a) of the Federal Trade
Commission Act codified as 15 U.S. Code § 45 (a). The FTC alleged that MPHJ employed deceptive
practices. These practices include the deceptive demand letters that MPHJ sent to alleged infringers.
In re MPHJ Tech. Inv. LLC, F.T.C. Matter No. 142-3003 (F.T.C. Nov. 6, 2014). The FTC has found
that demand letters have not been the main issue and that demand letter reform would not be sufficient
to affect the nuisance suits. See FTC Study, supra note 34. at 100–01. Nonetheless, multiple
legislations have been tabled to set the minimum that needed to be included within these demand
letters. Id. at 31–32.
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for their patents.131 Patent purchasers struggle to estimate patent values
because they may not understand the technology and its applications.132
Thus, even if licensors and licensees find each other, their valuation may
not match. As a repeat player, the USPTO can help set a satisfying price
for both parties during bilateral negotiation.133 Albeit not currently
specialized in pricing, the USPTO can leverage its expertise in patent
granting to enhance its patent valuation ability. After all, the USPTO is
full of patent experts.134 Alternatively, the USPTO could serve as a
centralized auction house where willing sellers and purchasers could meet.
Willing sellers could auction their patents to ensure that knowledge is
actually transferred.
Second, the USPTO also has a comparative advantage in
enforcing patents. The USPTO has more resources than most patent
enforcers do. It would not suffer from budget constraints afflicting small
patent holders. The USPTO has patent experts on hand. It could evaluate
infringement claims and make recommendations at a lower cost than
attorneys make. The USPTO can complement enforcement with public
policy; it can change rules and adapt when it sees inefficient issues with
enforcement and patenting approval methods.
The USPTO has an interest in a well-functioning enforcement
system. Its mandate should be amended to reflect this interest. Without an
enforcement mechanism, patents and the USPTO become irrelevant. For
example, the USPTO could use its prosecutorial discretion to discourage
fraudulent or nuisance suits.135
131
Some have argued that patent holders are likely to overvalue their patents. See e.g. Scott
Iyama, The USPTO's proposal of a biological research tool patent pool doesn't hold water, 57
STANFORD L. REV. 1223, 1233 (2005) (discussing the cognitive bias that lead to patent holder
overvaluing their patent ex-ante).
132
See, e.g., Robert Pitkethly, The valuation of patents: a review of patent valuation
methods with consideration of option based methods and the potential for further research, The Judge
Institute of Management Studies WP 21/97 (1997) (discussing patent valuation methods)
http://www.cambiotec.org.mx/cyted/documentos/avaluo/doc rpit kethlyl.pdf (last visited Jul. 23,
2016).
133
Patent examiners investigate prior art. They are involved in re-examination proceedings.
They gain valuable experience and expertise understanding novelty and citation system, which are
driving elements of patent valuation. See, e.g., Allen W. Wang, Rise of the patent intermediaries, 25
BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 159, 183–190 (2010) (discussing the value of experts in assisting in the
valuation process).
134
Dietmar Harhoff, Frederic M. Scherer, & Katrin Vopel, Citations, family size,
opposition and the value of patent rights, 32 RESEARCH POLICY 1343 (2003) (empirically estimating
the factors affecting patent valuation).
135
Nuisance suits are suits brought by patent holders who know that the defendant does not
infringe but the plaintiff hopes to leverage litigation costs to reach quick settlements. See e.g., Fiona
Scott Morton & Carl Shapiro, Patent Assertions: Are We Any Closer to Aligning Reward to
Contribution?, 16 INNOVATION POLICY AND THE ECONOMY 89, 93 (2015). These suits decrease social
welfare and the incentive to commercialize socially value products. Nefarious PAEs are associated
with these activities. See Mark A. Lemley & A. Douglas Melamed, Missing the Forest for the Trolls,
113 COLUM. L. REV. 2117 (2013) (discussing the different PAE business model and finding that one
type of business model PAE frequently engages in nuisance suits). If the patent system is to work,
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Even if the USPTO could not serve as an enforcer, it could at least
help—particularly smaller entities. For example, it could provide the
venue for an administrative court. It has neutral experts on hand that
already prosecuted the claim being litigated. If an administrative court
were to use a neutral expert provided by the USPTO, it could avoid lengthy
and onerous Markman hearings. At the least, the USPTO could create a
small claims court and use its experts in that venue.136
Finally, the USPTO should complement the efforts of private
PMEs.137 The public and private entities should act as complementary
brokers,138 and enforcers,139 to encourage a socially optimal IP system.

litigation or the threat of litigation must also exist. Therefore, stick licenses must also exist. The
general manager of France Brevets explains that they prefer to negotiate first and sue only if the alleged
infringer refuses to negotiate. He argues that this distinguishes them from US patent-trolls who sue
first and negotiate later. Schmitt, infra note 144. The HTC case in Germany was ruled on the merit.
The patent was held valid and infringed. France Brevets, Court decision on Validity against HTC in
Germany in the NFC patent disputes with France Brevets, Press Release (Jan. 22, 2016)
http://www.francebrevets.com/sites/default/files/
RELEASE_JAN%2022%202016_FRANCE_BREVETS.pdf. France Brevets succeeded
in reaching a license through settlements using this strategy. It filed a suit against LG, and they quickly
settled by agreeing to a license. In 2014, LG agreed a license France Brevets patents to settle the case.
France Brevets, France Brevets Licenses NFC Patents to LG ELECTRONICS as its First Licensee,
Press Release (Aug. 18, 2014). http://www.francebrevets.com/sites/default/files/FB_signs_LGE_RE
LEASE_18TH%20AUGUST.pdf).
136
In 2012, U.S. Patent and Trademark Office requested comments on a Patent Small
Claims Proceedings. Department of Commerce, United States Patent and Trademark Office, Request
for Comments on a Patent Small Claims Proceeding in the United States, 77 Fed. Reg. 243, [Docket
No. PTO–P–2012–0050] pgs. 74830-74831 (Dec. 18, 2012). See, e.g., response by Colleen Chien and
Michael J. Guo, Does the US Patent System Need a Patent Small Claims Proceeding? (2013) (not
supporting a small court claim) http://digitalcommons.law.scu.
edu/facpubs/666; Robert P. Greenspoon, Is the United States Finally Ready for a Patent
Small Claims Court?, 10 MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH. 549, 553–57 (2009) (recommending the
establishment of a patent small claims court).
137
The Constitution also requires that the Congress has the power to establish post offices
and post roads. U.S. CONST, art. I, § 8, cl. 7. Congress created a postal system and granted the US
Postal Services a monopoly until an exemption was carved out. See, e.g., Jill E. Fisch, How Do
Corporations Play Politics?: The FedEx Story, 58 VANDERBILT L. REV. 1495 (2005) (discussing the
challenge made to the postal service monopoly). The Constitution (Art. I, Sec. 8, Clause 8) has not
been read to establish a patent enforcing agency but if it were, such entity should arguably complement
private efforts because even the government has limited resources and benefits from private actions.
Such entities could also limit the negative externalities associated with the private efforts such as sham
litigation and bad practices.
138
See e.g. Colleen Chien, From Arms Race to Marketplace: The Complex Patent
Ecosystem and Its Implications for the Patent System (2010) 62 HASTINGS L. J. 297, 315–17
(discussing the role of intermediaries in the patent system, including sales such as IP auctions).
139
Garry A. Gabison, The Problems with the Private Enforcement of CERCLA: An
Empirical Analysis, 7 GEO. WASH. J. ENERGY & ENVTL. L. 189 (2016) (finding that public agency
often act as competitors for private suits and arguing that instead they should act complementarily).
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B. Rent seeking behavior: focusing on post-commercial
enforcement.
Aside from the upside discussed,140 PAEs and PMEs bring their
own problems. This section investigates the issue with receiving private
funds, and the next section investigates the issue with receiving public
funds.
First, for the most part, government sponsored PMEs are not
Sovereign Patent Funds. They are not state agencies, nor do they behave
like a benevolent social planner who minimizes negative externalities and
maximizes positive externalities and efficiencies. In practice, these entities
often become a public-private partnership: they become more independent
and do not remain accountable to the public.
First, because of their independence, they must remain solvent
(and potentially profitable to attract investments). This necessity can shift
their approach to licensing from pre- to post-commercialization. France
Brevets and IP Bridge have resorted to enforcement of infringed patents
(stick license).141 For example, France Brevets claims to negotiate patent
licenses with potential clients after aggregating patents;142 but France

140
See e.g. "These trolls act as a market intermediary in the patent market. Patent trolls
provide liquidity, market clearing, and increased efficiency to the patent markets—the same benefits
securities dealers supply capital markets." James F. McDonough, The Myth of the Patent Troll: An
Alternative View of the Function of Patent Dealers in an Idea Economy (2006) 56 EMORY L. J. 189,
190; "By creating options to generate rewards for innovators otherwise shutout of the marketplace . .
. . Together with contingency fee lawyers whose business models depend on choosing the right patents
and the right patentees, NPEs can create important avenues for appropriating rewards for valuable
patent rights that are owned by non-market players." David L. Schwartz & Jay P. Kesan, Analyzing
the role of non-practicing entities in the patent system, (2014) 99 CORNELL L. REV. 425, 434.
141
Nuisance suits differ from stick licensing. Stick licenses are licenses obtained or sought
under the threat of litigation. Stick licenses are common and necessary strategies to insure patent
holders are remunerated. Stick licenses settle cases while avoiding litigation. If the patent system is to
work, litigation or the threat of litigation must also exist. So, stick licenses must also exist. France
Brevets general manager explains that they prefer to negotiate first and sue only if the alleged infringer
refuses to negotiate. He argues that this distinguishes them from US patent-trolls who sue first and
negotiate later. Schmitt, infra note 144. The HTC case in Germany was ruled on the merit. The patent
was held valid and infringed. France Brevets, Court decision on Validity against HTC in Germany in
the NFC patent disputes with France Brevets, Press Release (Jan. 22, 2016)
http://www.francebrevets.com/sites/default/files/RELEASE_JAN%2022%202016_FRANCE_BRE
VETS.pdf (last visited Sep 21, 2018). France Brevets succeeded in reaching a license through
settlements using this strategy. It filed a suit against LG, and they quickly settled by agreeing to a
license. In 2014, LG agreed a license France Brevets patents to settle the case. France Brevets, France
Brevets Licenses NFC Patents to LG ELECTRONICS as its First Licensee, Press Release (Aug. 18,
2014).
http://www.francebrevets.com/sites/default/files/FB_signs_LGE_RELEASE_18TH%20AUGUST.p
df (last visited Sep 21, 2018).
142
“France Brevets” is an investment fund that intends to acquire rights over patents
developed through public and private research, to regroup them into a pool, and to license them.
Convention du 2 septembre 2010 (n 128) (author's translation).
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Brevets sued large multinationals who were already practicing the
patents.143
To remain solvent, they may also shift their focus from small
claims brought up by SMEs to large ticket items. These entities sue on
behalf of the innovator and collects fees.144 For example, France Brevets
uses a contingency-fee model.145 Contingencies have known limitations:
it incentivizes lawyers to focus on lawsuits with high damages.146
To remain solvent, this independence could lead to excessive
litigation147 and nuisance suits. Nuisance suits are a heavily criticized form
of rent seeking.148 In other words, the government can create deadweight
loss when it sponsors instead of oversees PMEs. Nonetheless, the loss
could be more limited than what most private PMEs may inflict. For
example, France Brevets and IP Bridge sued large multinationals but have
not gone after end-users, SMEs, or startups, which have been the target of
many demand letters that epitomize undesirable rent seeking behavior.149
Second, private interests could exploit these PMEs. Because these
entities receive private investments, their investors could exercise pressure
to enforce patents against their competitors.150 For example, IP Bridge
received funds and patents from the same entities151 (i.e. NEC, Panasonics,

143
France Brevets sued LG Electronics and HTC Corporation in the U.S. and in Germany.
See NXP Semiconductors USA Inc. v France Brevets SAS, No. C 14-1225 SI (ND Cal 2014)
(discussing France Brevets and its litigious efforts against LG and HTC).
144
Fabienne Schmitt, Brevets : une PME française gagne contre HTC, LES ECHOS (Mar.
27,
2015),
http://www.lesechos.fr/27/03/2015/lesechos.fr/0204261458707_brevets---une-pmefrancaise-gagne-contre-htc.htm (quoting fees a contingency between 30% and 60% of uncapped
revenues).
145
Contingency fee is a common arrangement in the US but a limited concept in Europe.
Cento Veljanovski, Third Party Litigation Funding in Europe, 8 J. L. ECON. & POLICY 405, 409 (2012)
(discussing the limited use or ban of contingency fee in “Austria; Belgium; Cyprus; Czech Republic;
Denmark; France; Greece; Ireland; Luxembourg; Malta; the Netherlands; Norway; Poland”).
146
Steven Shavell, The Fundamental Divergence Between the Private and the Social
Motive to Use the Legal System, 26 J. LEGAL STUDIES 575, n. 44 (1997).
147
Thomas J. Miceli, Do Contingent Fees Promote Excessive Litigation?, J. LEGAL
STUDIES 211 (1994).
148
See supra note 144 and accompanying text.
149
Lemley & Melamed, supra note 2.
150
Joshua D. Wright & Douglas H. Ginsburg, Patent Assertion Entities and Antitrust: A
Competition Cure for a Litigation Disease?, 79 ANTITRUST L. J. 501 (2014) (discussing antitrust
implication of patent assertion entities where practicing entities sell to PAEs with the aim that these
PAEs will assert against their rivals).
151
Einhorn, supra note 99.
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and Hitachi).152 In 2015, IP Bridge filed a complaint against TCL
Communications153 enforcing former Panasonic patents assigned.154
Distinguishing anticompetitive from financially motived
enforcements can be difficult. Practicing entities obtain patents in their
field. If a practicing entity assigns a patent to a government sponsored
PME for enforcement or licensing, the PME inevitably enforces the patent
against the assignor’s competitors. Thus, IP Bridge could have identified
TCL as an infringer and could have wanted to monetize the patent.
However, the reasons could be anti-competitive155 and the private
investors may have biased a government-sponsored entity’s activities.
Furthermore, this entity may function as a collusion device.156
Practitioners can use PMEs or PAEs to assert patents against competitors
to avoid counterclaims and reputational damage.157 Counterclaims are an
important part of the patent system because they can facilitate settlements
and cross-licensing. Without counterclaims, an alleged infringing
practitioner would need to raise a second (as-expensive) patent suit. The
patent assignor could leverage the cost of the second suit against the
alleged infringer to make negotiations more difficult.158 In such a situation,

152

IP Bridge, Patent Assignment by NEC Corporation to IP Bridge’s IP fund, (Dec. 2,
2014) http://ipbridge.co.jp/news-en/141202-01e; IP Bridge, Additional Large Video Codec related
Patent Portfolio Assignment by Panasonic Corporation to IP Bridge’s IP Fund and Entry as a
Licensor of Patent Pool, (May 29, 2015) http://ipbridge.co.jp/news-en/additional-large-video-codecrelated-patent-portfolio-assignment-by-panasonic-corporation-to-ip-bridges-ip-fund-and-entry-as-alicensor-of-patent-pool.
153
Godo Kaisha IP Bridge 1 v. TCL Communication Technology Holdings Limited et al,
1:15-cv-00634 (July 24, 2015 D. Del.)
154
Jacob Schindler, Japan’s sovereign patent fund initiates first legal action in the US,
accusing TCL of infringing three SEPs, INTELLECTUAL ASSERT MANAGEMENT (Sept. 3,
2015), http://www.iam-media.com/blog/detail.aspx?g=c67fb03e-c954-4e9e-8a31-dd0f6c32834e.
155
For example, TCL and Panasonic both manufacture LED/LCD television screens.
Panasonic may have flagged the infringement itself and IP Bridge to sue TLC to impede its activities.
David Katzmaier, Game mode on: CNET tests TVs for input lag, CNECT (June 3, 2013),
http://www.cnet.com/news/game-mode-on-cnet-tests-tvs-for-input-lag/.
156
Matthew Sipe, Patent Privateers and Antitrust Fears, 22 MICHIGAN
TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND TECH. L. REV. 191, 222–24 (2016) (for example, if multiple
competitors fund and assign their patents to the same government sponsored entity, this entity could
act as a joint-venture where they can discuss competitors and as a collusive device. In the case of IP
Bridge, NEC, Panasonics, and Hitachi funded and transferred patents to IP Bridge. If NEC was to
infringe a Panasonic patent, the PME may not litigate because it might be against its own interests.
Instead, it focuses on the competitors of its funders. It cartelizes the funders who might be sued if not
complying with the cartel’s direction. The PME would have an extensive portfolio that it could
leverage in court against cartel members if they deviated. The PME could eliminate their
competitors).
157
Patent Assertion and U.S. Innovation, THE WHITE HOUSE, p. 5–6
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/
default/files/docs/patent_report.pdf (last visited July 29, 2016) (discussing how PAEs are
immune to counterclaims and care little about reputational harm).
158
Apple Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., 757 F. 3d 1286, 1333 (DC Cir 2014) (discussing
injunctions and the eBay factors and defining a “hold out” as “an unwilling licensee of an SEP
seeking to avoid a license based on the value that the technological advance contributed to the prior
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a government sponsored PME would create further enforcement
inefficiencies.
C. International trade and nationalism
Private funding may induce inefficiencies by encouraging profit
raising instead of efficient raising behavior. However, the involvement of
public entity or public funding raises other concerns of conflict of interest
or nationalist behavior. This section looks at these criticisms.
Government sponsored PMEs have been criticized159 because they
could target companies “to advantage domestic firms by harassing foreign
competitors.”160 This statement highlights two potential issues. PMEs can
discriminate twice. They can discriminate against foreign companies when
seeking patents to enforce (or purchase in the case of PAEs) and they can
discriminate against foreign companies when enforcing patents.
Intellectual Discovery, IP Bridge, and France Brevets have not openly
discriminated when acquiring and selling patents.
Table 7 shows where they acquired their U.S. patents. In the U.S.,
Intellectual Discovery has registered three hundred and thirty-nine unique
transactions with entities from South Korea, the United States, Singapore,
Canada, Japan, and Hong Kong.161 In the U.S., IP Bridge has been
involved in forty unique transactions involving Japan and United States
entities. In the U.S., France Brevets has been involved in twenty-three
unique transactions with entities from Europe, Korea, and the United
States.
Table 7: Patent assigned to government PAEs
Country
assignor

of

Intellectual
Discovery

IP Bridge

France Brevet

art.”). (In the context of SEPs, when the defendants leverage litigation costs to make negotiation
more difficult carries, this phenomenon is named a hold out).
159
See e.g. Howard Williams, The U.S. Supreme Court Hopes To Limit Patent Trolling,
FORBES (August 4, 2014) http://www.forbes.com/sites/realspin/2014/08/04/the-u-s-supreme-courthopes-to-limit-patent-trolling/.
160
Michael J. Meurer and James Bessen, Congress needs to rein in patent troll BOSTON
GLOBE (November 5, 2014) http://www.bostonglobe.com/opinion/2014/11/04/congress-needs-reinpatent-trolls/BSuITBqcU11mtYIr
qSK6yO/story.html.
161
All data is extracted from http://assignment.uspto.gov/ (last visited Jul. 31 2016).
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Home
country (or
territory)
Other
countries
Total

259

810

68%

1184

97%

176

95%

381

32%

42

3%

9

5%

1191

100%

1226

100%

185

100%

As of July 31, 2016
source: USPTO
All three exhibited a preference for acquiring patents from entities
from their home territory. Non-nationalistic reasons can explain this
observation. For example, their contact network likely extends further at
home. The common language likely helps negotiations. The negotiation
culture can also explain preferences to deal with these entities.
These three entities have not exhibited a preference in their
assignment strategies. Intellectual Discovery has assigned more patents to
non-Korean than Korean entities.162 France Brevet has only assigned to
non-European companies. IP Bridge has exhibited the highest preferences
for home-nation entities as an assignor and assignee.
Table 8: Patent assigned by government PAEs
Country
assignor

of

Home
country (or
territory)
Other
countries
Total

Intellectual
Discovery

IP Bridge

France Brevet

26

48%

38

100%

0

0%

28

52%

0

0%

5

100%

54

100%

1226

100%

185

100%

As of July 31, 2016
source: USPTO
Government sponsored PMEs/PAEs have raised concerns over
their licensing and enforcement strategies. So far, these entities have
targeted non-home territory entities for enforcement. For example, France
Brevets has sued HTC, a Chinese phone manufacturer, and LG, a Korean
phone manufacturer. It quickly settled with LG163 whereas a German court
162
See e.g. Ellis, supra note 94 (as previously stated, Intellectual Discovery assigned
patents to Game and Technology which might be their own shell corporation).
163
France Brevets, France Brevets assigne LG et HTC en contrefaçon, PRESS RELEASE
(December 9, 2013)
http://www.francebrevets.com/sites/default/files/FB_NFC_PR_FRENCH_DEC_9.pdf; France
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decided the HTC case.164 France Brevets has granted licenses on the same
technology to Sony165 and Samsung.166 In the latter cases, France Brevets
did not file a suit.167 Despite its mandate,168 France Brevets’ deals lacked
transparency.
Transparency can help diminish the nationalistic fear because
competitors could confirm non-discriminatory treatment. Nondiscriminatory treatment is part of IP Bridge’s stated goal. IP Bridge
claims that they “litigate regardless of nationality, and offer equitable deals
to any company as well.”169 Nonetheless, IP Bridge has sued direct
competitors of their patent assignors.
Transparency and disclosure of licensing terms has other positive
externalities. Disclosure can help create best practices and inform market
participants about expected costs, standard terms, etc.
Discriminatory results do not signify discriminatory intent. For
example, a country may not have any companies in the market; hence, any
action it brings would be against foreign companies.170 Attributing such
intent requires a logic leap.
Assuming that these PMEs target foreign entities, these actions
would harm its citizen and could harm national companies. First, any
royalty collected would increase the cost of doing business. This increase
is partially passed on to consumers, who lose purchasing power.

Brevets, France Brevets Licenses NFC Patents to LG ELECTRONICS as its First Licensee, PRESS
RELEASE (August 18, 2014)
http://www.francebrevets.com/sites/default/files/FB_signs_LGE_RELEASE_18TH%20AUGUST.p
df.
164
Supra note 141.
165
France Brevet Licenses NFC Patents to Sony, PRESS RELEASE (April 4, 2016)
http://www.francebrevets.com/
sites/default/files/France%20Brevet%20Licenses%20NFC%20Patents%20to%20Sony_e
ng.pdf.
166
BRIEF-Inside Secure says France Brevets licenses NFC patents to Samsung, REUTERS
(May 30, 2016) http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSFWN18R04A.
167
Since the patents had already been challenged and held valid, Sony and Samsung
could only opt to license the technology unless they wanted to challenge infringement.
168
Convention du 2 septembre 2010 entre l'Etat, l'Agence nationale de la recherche et la
Caisse des dépôts et consignations relative au programme d'investissements d'avenir (action « France
Brevets »), Journal Officiel de la République Française (JORF) n°0205 p. 16153, n.1 (Sep. 4, 2010),
https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/eli/convention/2010/9/2/PRMX
1022556X/jo/texte.
169
Jacob Schindler, Japan’s sovereign patent fund initiates first legal action in the US,
accusing TCL of infringing three SEPs, INTELL. ASSET MNGT (Sep. 3, 2015) http://www.iammedia.com/Blog/Detail.aspx?g=
c67fb03e-c954-4e9e-8a31-dd0f6c32834e.
170
Note that France, Korea, and Japan all have players in most markets. So, their actions
could be conceived as protectionist in spite of their unknown true intent.
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Second, any action opens the door to retaliation on companies
doing business abroad. For example, France Brevets has collected
licensing fees from LG and Samsung, Korean phone manufacturers, and
Sony, a Japanese equipment manufacturer. Korea and Japan have their
own government sponsored PMEs. These Korean and Japanese PMEs may
retaliate against French manufacturers in the much larger Asian market.171
Even if some countries have not yet created their own PMEs, they may do
so in the future.172
Retaliation is a certain risk. Bilateral exposure should decrease
nationalistic intent.173 In the dumping context, one study found that antidumping allegations are less likely against a country in which relation
exposure is higher.174
Finally, these entities are government-sponsored or state-owned.
The three discussed entities have acted on home and foreign soil.
Multilateral or bilateral international trade treaties often address the
activities of state-owned enterprises. For example, the General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade that has been signed by France, Japan, and Korea
addresses “State Trading Enterprises.”175
More recent trade agreements like the agreement between Korea
and the United States (KORUS)176 address state enterprises more
specifically. The treaty specifies that:
Each Party shall ensure that any state enterprise that it
establishes or maintains:
(a) acts in a manner that is not inconsistent with the Party’s
obligations under this Agreement wherever such enterprise
171
France has few phone manufacturers that operate worldwide: Alcatel-Lucent (acquired
by Nokia in 2015), Archos, Group Bull, MobiWire, and Wiko (majority owned by Tinno Mobile, a
Chinese group). Note that the patent enforced by France Brevets against HTC and LG had been
assigned by a non-practitioner: so, the litigation’s aim was financial instead of strategic and it would
be insulated from retaliation, but other French companies would not. A governmental—even
sponsored—entity would be aware of the negative impacts on its trade relations.
172
Jacob Schindler, Taiwan remains a bystander as patent fund activity heats up in
China, Korea and Japan, INTELL. ASSET MNGT. (Mar. 28, 2016) http://www.iammedia.com/blog/detail.aspx?g=456d66a4-c015-45d7-b12d-cd75abe047eb (France Brevet also sued
HTC, a Taiwanese phone manufacturer. Taiwan does not currently have such government sponsored
PME but have considered and attempted to create one).
173
Przemyslaw Kowalski, Max Büge, Monika Sztajerowska, & Matias Egeland, StateOwned Enterprises: Trade Effects and Policy Implications, OECD TRADE POLICY Papers, No. 147,
OECD Publishing (2013) http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/5k4869ckqk7l-en (in the past, state-owned
enterprises have arguably acted inconsistently with international regulations and treaties).
174
Bruce A. Blonigen & Chad P. Bown, Antidumping and retaliation threats, 60 J. INT'L
ECON. 249 (2003).
175
GATT Art. XVII (The treaty specifies that these entities must “act in a manner
consistent with the general principles of non-discriminatory treatment prescribed in this Agreement
for governmental measures affecting imports or exports by private traders.”).
176
United States-Korea Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act, H.R. 3080 (112th)
(KORUS)
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exercises any regulatory, administrative, or other governmental
authority that the Party has delegated to it, such as the power to
expropriate, grant licenses, approve commercial transactions,
or impose quotas, fees, or other charges; and
(b) accords non-discriminatory treatment in the sale of its goods
or services to covered investments.177

These treaties focus on non-discriminatory treatment and hold the
signatory party responsible for the actions of its entities. KORUS specifies
that granting licenses and imposing charges is an example of activities
demanding equal treatment. Both activities are central to PME activities.
Actions of government-sponsored PMEs might be construed as
government actions. If governmental actions affect trade, these actions can
be interpreted as violating international trade agreements and lead to
sanctions. Within the context of KORUS, if Intellectual Discovery acted
against US companies discriminatorily, its actions could be challenged.178
However, these government sponsored PMEs/PAEs would not likely lead
to international sanctions because the definition of state entity remains
contentious.179 In recent cases,180 the World Trade Organization
established that to be qualified as a “public body,” an entity must exhibit
more than financial backing from a government.181 These entities must
perform governmental functions.182

177

KORUS Art. 16-3 (emphasis added).
Godo Kaisha IP Bridge 1, supra note 106 (this potential issue may explain why
Intellectual Discovery has yet to enforce directly patents against private parties.). Game and
Technology Co. Ltd v. Blizzard Entertainment, Inc. et al., 2:2015cv01257 (ED Tex. Jul. 9, 2016);
Game and Technology Co. Ltd v. Riot Games, Inc., 2:2015cv01258 (ED Tex. Jul. 9, 2016); Game
and Technology Co. Ltd v. Valve Corporation, 2:15-cv-01259 (ED Tex. Jul. 9, 2016); Game and
Technology Co. Ltd v. Wargamingnet LLP et al., 2:2015cv01260 (ED Tex. Jul. 9, 2016) (instead, it
may have shielded from international sanctions by divesting the eight patents enforced). Reel Frame
34847-659.
179
Nguyen, supra note 13, at 1288–94 (discussing in detail the World Trade Organization
implications, Nguyen states that these entities could be in violation of WTO agreements).
180
United States - Countervailing Duty Measures on Certain Products from China - AB2014-8 - Report of the Appellate Body (WT/DS437/AB/R); United States - Countervailing
Measures on Certain Hot-Rolled Carbon Steel Flat Products from India - AB-2014-7 - Report of the
Appellate Body (WT/DS436/AB/R) (in these cases, the US Department of Commerce investigated
subsidies of foreign goods imported to the US. The US imposed countervailing duties. Those duties
were stuck down in court because the US focused on entity ownership to classify them as
government bodies).
181
United States - Countervailing Duty Measures on Certain Products from China - AB2014-8 - Report of the Appellate Body (WT/DS437/AB/R) §§ 7.72–.75.
182
Id. at § 7.69 (the government-backed entity must carry out the “essence” of
governmental function. This includes “the performance of governmental functions or the fact of
being vested with, and exercising, the authority to perform such functions are core commonalities
between government and public body.”).
178
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Sanctions against a government for sponsoring a PME would fail
because it requires trade authorities to make too many leaps.183 Even if
patent enforcement and licensing have been compared to an innovation
tax,184 the tax is not systematic on all imports.185 These PMEs behave more
like private entities than government entities. Japan, Korea, France, etc.
can point to private entities that offer the same services.186
Even if sanctions can be avoided, the overt nationalist or
protectionist criticisms will continue. But these criticisms would miss the
point that the private PAEs or PMEs would fill that space without the
safeguard that a government could provide.
CONCLUSION
These entities are neither private nor public. Since they must
generate profit, some have behaved less like a benevolent social planner
and more like a for-profit entity. Over 90% of the IP Bridge patents were
assigned by large multinationals, who are capable of enforcing their own
patents. The SMEs remain left to themselves to enforce their patents.
These entities may nonetheless benefit some IP holders. Close to
90% of Intellectual Discovery patents were assigned by research institutes
and universities. These institutes may not have profited from their IP.187
183
Annex 11-B § 3 (most trade agreement, like the KORUS agreement, also address
government actions that elevate to the level of expropriation. Whether an injunction amounts to such
expropriation requires another leap. The trade treaty specifies that an indirect government action can
elevate to expropriation. The analysis remains case specific. The analysis requires investigating the
objective and context of the government action. Enhancing patent enforcement would not likely
constitute an objective valuable enough to shield from potential sanctions. See also Metalclad Corp.
v. United Mexican States, 40 ILM 36 (ICSID 2000) (holding that a Mexican municipality and hence
the Mexican government did not treat the plaintiff fairly when it fails to transparently deny a
construction permit to a waste disposal facility for environment reasons after it was lead to invest
under the belief it would be granted. However, lawfully granted injunction – particularly from
foreign courts – would not raise to this level of expropriation).
184
See e.g. Gerard N. Magliocca, Blackberries and barnyards: Patent trolls and the
perils of innovation, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1809, 1810, 1837 (2007).
185
Subsidies of exports and taxes of imports have arguably comparable effects. Only a
few companies are pursued and “taxed.” In the cases discussed, the taxation is performed on US soil,
a foreign jurisdiction; hence, it could be construed as a subsidy instead of a tax. The PMEs have
mostly sued in foreign companies in US courts.
186
Even if the innovation tax or subsidy imposed by these PMEs could be compared to
discriminatory governmental actions, their imposition relies on patent infringement theory. It
requires a court judgment to show that the defendants did not infringe. One who seeks equity must
do equity. In this case, it is not clear that equity has be performed by all parties.
187
See e.g., Damien Geradin, Anne Layne-Farrar, and A. Jorge Padilla, Elves or Trolls?
The role of nonpracticing patent owners in the innovation economy, 21 INDUSTRIAL AND
CORPORATE CHANGE 73 (2011) (arguing that non-practicing entities can have an upside); Mark A.
Lemley & Robin Feldman, Is Patent Enforcement Efficient, 98 BU L. REV. 649 (2018) (discussing
the inefficiencies associated with non-practicing patent entities while acknowledging their
theoretical upsides. This tool in the hand of a benevolent social planner could set an example for the
rest of the industry. This standard setting resonates in other facets of government (e.g., employment
conditions, salary, etc.). PAEs/PMEs like every tool have upsides and downsides).
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To harness the upside and decrease the downside, governments can create
not-for-profit public-private partnerships. Such a not-for-profit entity
could serve the IP system and the right holders better.
Since they receive public backing, their actions receive more
scrutiny. Discriminatory results may not correlate with discriminatory
intent. Transparency remains the government’s most potent ally and these
entities should set the tone for the rest of the industry.
If the governments are willing to enter this market where
reputational damages are abundant and risks are plenty, it signals that they
believe they have a lot to earn. Whether it is addressing inefficiencies of
the IP system or simply raising profits for right holders, these entities are
propagating. For example, in 2014 in China, Ruichuan IPR Funds was
launched as a public-private partnership.188
The action of these government sponsored PMEs should be
addressed in perspective. They account for a small portion of patents and
suits in the United States. The three PMEs together hold about 2,500 U.S.
patents. Since their inception in 2010, the USPTO has granted over 1.5
million patents.189 These PMEs brought a handful of suits in the U.S. in
2015. In comparison, in the 2014 fiscal year, 5,550 patent suits were filed
in Federal District Courts.190 These entities remain a new phenomenon.
They are still perfecting their business model, but they should be
encouraged to adopt best practices before it is too late.
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Williams, supra note 159; Meurer & Bessen, supra note 160; Peter Roff, The
frightening emergence of government patent trolls, WASHINGTON TIMES (Aug. 31, 2014)
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/
2014/aug/31/roff-the-frightening-emergence-of-government-paten/.
189
U.S. Patent Activity Calendar Years 1790 to the Present, USPTO,
https://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/h_counts.htm.
190
U.S. Courts, Annual Report of the Director: Judicial Business of the United States
Courts, ADMINISTRATION OFFICE OF THE US COURTS, Table C-2 (Sept. 2015).

